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Zealand since enactment of the Commerce Act 1986. It provides a 
background to the Harvard and Chicago theories of competition policy 
and some commentary on this debate in New Zealand. The paper 
examines the trend of the Commerce Commission and Court decisions in 
the past and comments on a recent Government review on the 
implementation of the test together with an indepth analysis of the 
Commerce Commission's guidelines to the assessment of public benefit 
and detriment issued in October 1994. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
"The Commerce Act was not designed to generate more 
competition. Rather its scope was to protect the competitive 
, process from private arrangements aimed at reducing competition. 
\ Competition law needs a kind of cost/benefit test in order to 
distinguish between desirable and undesirable anti-competitive 
arrangements. Currently this is provided by the competition 
thresholds, which identify behaviour which is likely to be 
undesirable and the Public Benefit Test which permits otherwise 
anti competitive conduct and mergers, if it is demonstrated that they 
d . bf " I are eszra e . 
This statement by the combined working group of the Treasury, Ministry 
of Commerce and Justice Department aptly summarises the purpose of the 
Public Benefit Test contained in the Commerce Act 1986 (the Act). This 
paper examines the Public Benefit Test in the Act provided under sections 
61 and 67 against a background of the Harvard and Chicago theories of 
competition law and proceeds to perform an analysis of the Commerce 
Commission's Guidelines for the Public Benefit Test2 recently introduced, 
as to its consistency with the provisions of the Act. 
2 
See Discussion Document by Ministry of Commerce, The Treasury, Department of 
Justice, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 1991. 
Guidelines to the Analysis of Public Benefits and Detriments in the Context of the 
Commerce Act, Commerce Commission, October 1994. 
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2 
The Public Benefit Test has been at the centre of the antitrust debate 
worldwide and has received very close scrutiny in New Zealand recently. 
The path taken by the Public Benefit Test since the enactment of the 
Commerce Act 1986 will be the focus of this paper. It will proceed to 
investigate the advantages and disadvantages of the test in its current form 
an application. 
3 
II THE ANTITRUST OBJECTIVES DEBATE 
A A Background 
Easterbrook, a much respected economist of recent times describes the 
antitrust laws as general interest statutes. In his view the proponents have 
bargained for the opinions of the courts and the judiciary has had broad 
power to construe the antitrust laws in the public interest. "Public 
Interest" in his view means efficiency and indeed Easterbrook asserts that 
the antitrust laws were intended to promote efficiency, and he maintains 
the courts should formulate antitrust principles and should apply or 
withhold enforcement of the law in an effort to derive efficient out comes.3 
This describes the typical Chicago school goals on antitrust law, 
Easterbrook being a major proponent of the Chicago view point together 
with Bork, Posner ( etc ). This view of the goals of antitrust is a more 
recent development. 
The traditional view 1s known as the Harvard school of thought and 
favours a wider objective. Robert Lande says that while it is unanimously 
agreed that the US Congress enacted antitrust laws to encourage 
competition, disagreement continues over its ultimate goals.4 
Eleanor M Fox "The Politics of law and Economics in Judicial Decision Making" New 
York University Law Review Vo! 61 554 p562 citing Easterbrook "The Limits of 
Antitrust 63 Tex Rev 1,24 (1984). 
Robert H Lande "Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust : 
The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged" Hastings Law Journal Vol 34 p 67 . 
4 
The traditional or Harvard view contends that the U.S Congress was 
largely motivated by a number of social, moral and political concems.5 
These goals include promotion of small business and creation of 
entrepreneurial activity, prevention of industrial concentration and 
promotion of individual liberty. 
Lande's conclusion is that the debate is yet unresolved and he proceeds to 
argue that congress passed antitrust laws to further economic objectives, 
but primarily objectives of a distributive nature rather than of an efficiency 
nature. He says Congress was concerned principally with preventing 
"unfair" transfers of wealth from consumers to firms with market power. 
However he contends that although the goal of antitrust may be 
distributional in preventing unfair acquisition of consumer wealth it was 
not meant to secure a "fair" overall distribution of wealth in the economy 
or to help the poor.6 
Thus it could be said that both views ie. Harvard and Chicago have the 
common objective of eliminating monopoly power and encourage 
progressiveness in the use of resources, however they diverge in their 
thinking on who should share the benefits gained from such efficiencies. 
In New Zealand the evolvement of competition law is described by Ahdar 
in an article on competition saying: 
6 
"competition law and Policy conjures up very little in the minds of 
New Zealand lawyers. Some, over the years have heard of the 
Above n4, 69. 
Above n4, 70. 
5 
United States antitrust laws. Yet these seemed a peculiarly 
American situation, tailor made for that great bastion of free 
enterprise not readily transportable elsewhere .... 
. . .. Much has changed of late. The fourth Labour Government's 
systematic programme of economic liberalisation was the catalyst 
for widespread changes in virtually every area of life in New 
Zealand Law, and in particular competition law, was no exception. ... 
We can now point to a modern, robust antitrust regime". 7 
More recently the Harvard v Chicago debate has been a major part of 
economic discussion in New Zealand. The Traditionalists or the 
Harvardians in New Zealand say that the Commerce Act 1986 has stated 
its objective in its preamble: 
"An Act to promote Competition in markets within New Zealand ... "8 
Thus they say protection of Competition is the primary objective of the 
Act. However the New Zealand Chicagoans do not endorse this. They 
offer the following comment in a paper produced by the New Zealand 
Business Round Table; an organisation of powerful private enterprise 
representatives: 
Ahdar "Essays in Commercial Law" Borrowdal and Rowe 199 I 
The Commerce Act I 986 
6 
"Adopting 'competition' as an objective of antitrust law risks 
compromising the efficiency objective. Instead competition may be 
pursued as an objective in itself. The result may be to prevent 
efficiency enhancing arrangements which reduce the number of 
players in a market or lower transaction costs. Practices which 
enhance efficiency overall but which result in greater market power 
may be prevented or deterred. An explicit recognition that the 
objective of the Act is to promote economic efficiency as a means to 
enhancing consumer welfare would improve the focus of the Act".
9 
Although promotion of effective competition is quoted in the preamble 
and is a visible purpose of the New Zealand Commerce Act 1986 
supporting the traditionalist Harvard view, the Chicagoan's thinking has 
not gone unnoticed. Certain amendments to the Act were introduced in 
1990 which included a new section 3A 
10 which introduced an obligation to 
have regard to "any efficiencies" in determining authorisations. This is a 
notable concession to the Chicago view point. Another provision 
introduced was section 26
11 of the Act which required the Commission to 
have regard to the economic policies of the government. 
9 
10 
II 
The New Zealand Business Round Table "Antitrust in New Zealand : The Case for 
Reform 1988, p 14. 
Commerce Act 1986, section 3A : Where the Commission is required under this Act to 
determine whether or not or the extent to which, conduct will result, or will be likely to 
result in a benefit to the public, the Commission shall have regard to any efficiencies 
that the Commission considers will result, or will be likely to result, from that conduct. 
Commerce Act 1986, section 26 : In the exercise of its powers under this Act, the 
Commission shall have regard to the economic policies of the Government as 
transmitted in writing from time to time to the Commission by the Minister. 
7 
These amendments to the Act do not however convey a definite leaning or 
bias towards either viewpoint, hence the debate continues in New Zealand 
as to the application of the Act, to Competition Policy, more particularly 
the application of the Public Benefit Test. 
B Reasons Behind the Conflict 
Economists have universally condemned inefficiencies ansmg from 
monopoly pncmg. Monopoly power most directly affects allocative 
efficiency and wealth distribution of an economy. Having said that, 
monopolies do have other effects positive or not, on the productive 
efficiency of an economy. Firms' desires to earn profits could motivate 
businesses to compete energetically, to lower costs and prices and 
improve the quality of the product.
12 
It is submitted however that having gained these efficiencies and reached 
the position of maximum profit the firms would have reached a comfort 
zone if no hard competition existed to motivate more efficiencies. Thus 
the efficiency concept at saturation point results in slackness, lack of 
innovation and other undesirable economic consequences. It is submitted 
that efficiencies could bring about short term benefits to an economy, but 
in the long term would result in consequential inefficiencies. 
On the other hand in a competitive market a firm cannot increase prices 
above marginal costs without losing market share. The origin of the 
12 Robert H Lande "Wealth Transfers and the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust -
Hastings Law Journal vol 34 p78. 
8 
concept of perfect competition is traceable to Adam Smith who introduced 
the phrase "free competition". 
"The price of monopoly is upon every occasion the highest which 
can be got. The natural price or the price of free competition on 
the contrary is the lowest which can be taken .... 13 
Competition would force market prices down because multiple producers 
attracted by higher profits would necessarily increase supply. Thus 
competition is a process of reactive response through rivalry. 
Those who support efficiency theories counteract the inefficiencies 
occurring at maximum profit levels with contestability arguments. 14 They 
argue that any decline in productive or allocative efficiency will attract 
competitors into the market through hit and run entry which would provide 
a check on any consequential inefficiencies. However it is submitted that 
this may not always be the case. As sometimes firms that have merged 
having proven efficiency gains would be in dominant positions in a market 
where their conduct could prevent market entry. 
Thus the traditional view is that competition is the best policy as this will 
ensure maximum economic efficiency in the long term. The Chicagoans 
on the other hand appear to focus on immediate and short term efficiency 
gams. The Chicagoan view in the US was also a reaction to various 
political and populist theories such as freedom to trade for small 
13 
14 
J P Nieuwenhuysen "Theory of Competition Policy" p21, citing Adam Smith. 
Douglas F Greer "Contestability in Competition Policy" p41. 
9 
competitors etc which had very little economic justification. The New 
Zealand economic situation is quite different to the US, hence a direct 
importation of Chicagoan efficiency policies versus Harvadian 
competition policy may not be entirely suitable. 
10 
III THE AUTHORISATION PROCESS AND THE PUBLIC 
BENEFIT TEST DEFINED? 
The Act sets out in detail the procedure applicants should follow to obtain 
authorisation of an otherwise prohibited practice ie. a Restrictive Trade 
Practice or prohibited mergers ie. business acquisitions. The Commerce 
Commission is responsible for enforcement of the Act and for determining 
authorisations. The diagram below shows the methodology adopted for 
authorisation applications. 15 
15 
Relevant Market? 
Is the Practictuthorisable? 
Extent of the Lessening of Competition? 
Effects caused by the L!sening of Competition? 
! 
Resultant Benefit(s) to the Public? 
Net Public Benefit Outweighs !y Net Competitive Detriment? 
! 
Authorisation Granted/Declined 
Rex Ahdar "Competition Law and Policy in New Zealand 1991 Chap 12 Adopted in 
Weddel Crown [1987] 1 NZBLC (Com) 104,200. 
11 
As can be seen from the above diagram the ultimate test for deciding if an 
otherwise prohibited practice should be authorised or not is whether the 
Public Benefit to be gained from such a practice would outweigh any 
detriment arising from the lessening of competition or from gaining a 
dominant position. This process is commonly referred to as the "Public 
Benefit Test". In order to apply the Public Benefit Test the Commission 
should firstly have determined that the proposed conduct would 
substantially lessen competition in the market. 
A The Public Benefit Test In The Act 
The Public Benefit Test in the Act is contained in Sections 61(6), 61(7), 
61(8) and 67(3). 
The Test under 61(6) is applied in dealing with contracts arrangements or 
understandings to which Section 2i6 might apply. 
61(6) {Benefit outweighing lessening competition]. The Commission 
shall not make a determination granting an authorisation pursuant 
to an application under section 58(1) to (4) of this Act unless it is 
satisfied that: 
16 
a) The entering into of the contract or arrangement or the 
arriving at the understanding; or 
Commerce Act 1986 section 27(1) No person shall enter into a contract or arrangement 
or arrive at an understanding, containing a provision that has the purpose, or has or is 
likely to have the effect of substantially lessening competition in a market. 
12 
b) The giving effect to the provision of the contract, 
arrangement or understanding; or 
c) The giving or the requiring of the giving of the covenant; or 
d) The carrying out or enforcing of the terms of the covenant: 
as the case may be, to which the application relates, will in 
all the circumstances result, or be likely to result, in a 
benefit to the public which would outweigh the lessening in 
competition that would result, or would be likely to result or 
is deemed to result therefore. 
The test under 61 (7) has been interpreted by the Commission to be the 
same as 61(6) although some ambiguity exists in the wording contained in 
the sections. Of these sections 61 (7) is applied when dealing with 
arrangements which might contain exclusionary provisions under section 
29 17 of the Act and 61 (8) is applied to practices of Resale Price 
Maintenance under section 3i8 and 38 19
 of the Act. Practices of resale 
17 
18 
19 
Section 29( 1) for the purpose of this Act, a provision of a contract, arrangement or 
understanding is an exclusionary provision if: 
(a) It is a provision of a contract or arrangement entered into, or understanding 
arrived at between persons of whom any two or more are in competition with 
each other. 
Commerce Act 1986 section 37(1) no person shall engage in the practice of resale price 
maintenance. 
Commerce Act 1986 section 38(1) no person (in this section referred to as a "third 
party" shall engage in conduct, whether alone or in concert with any other person that 
will hinder or prevent the supply of goods to, or the acquisition of goods from, another 
13 
pnce maintenance are deemed to be in breach of section 2i0 thus 
presumed to substantially lessen competition in the market. The Public 
Benefit Test would be applied without a determination under section 27. 
61(7) 
20 
[Benefit permitting exclusionary provision, etcj. The 
Commission shall not make a determination granting an 
authorisation pursuant to an application under section 58(5) 
or (6) of this Act unless it is satisfied that: 
a) The entering into of the contract or arrangement or the 
arriving at the understanding; or 
b) The giving effect o the exclusionary provision of the 
contract, or arrangement or understanding: 
as the case may be, to which the applications relates, will in 
all the circumstances result, or be likely to result, in such a 
benefit to the public that: 
c) The contract or arrangement or understanding should be 
permitted to be entered into or arrived at; or 
person for the purpose of inducing that person not to sell those goods at a price less 
than a price specified by the third party. 
Above nl6. 
61(8) 
14 
d) The exclusionary provision should be permitted to be given 
effect to. 
[Benefit permitting resale prices maintenance]. The 
Commission shall not make a determination granting an 
authorisation pursuant to an application under section 58(7) 
or (8) of this Act unless it is satisfied that: 
a) The engaging in the practice of resale price maintenance to 
which the application relates; or 
b) The Act or conduct to which the application relates: 
as the case may be, will in all the circumstances result, or be 
likely to result, in result a benefit to the public that: 
c) The engaging in the practice should be permitted; or 
d) The Act or conduct should be permitted. 
The test under 67(3)(b) is essentially the same as 61(7) and 61(8) and is 
applied in authorisation·applications dealing with Business Acquisitions: 
15 
67(3)(b) If it is satisfied that the acquisition will result, or will be 
likely to result, in such a benefit to the public that it should 
be permitted, by notice in writing to the person by or on 
whose behalf the notice was given, grant an authorisation 
for the acquisition; 
B "Public Benefit" 
The words Public Benefit is not defined in the Act. As Ahdar says "not 
surprisingly the commission has utilised the accumulated wisdom and 
experience of the Australian Trade Practices environment in developing its 
own notion of Public Benefit for New Zealand".2' In doing this the 
Commission has taken account of a very wide ranging category of possible 
benefits. Also both in Australia and in New Zealand the question is asked 
when will a benefit be public? 
John Duns in a recent article22 quotes the Tribunal in Queensland Co-
Operative Milling Association23 in attempting a definition of the words 
Public Benefit: 
21 
22 
23 
"Anything of value to the community generally, any contribution to 
the aims pursued by the Society including as one of its principal 
elements ... the achievement of the economic goals of efficiency and 
Rex Ahdar "The Authorisation Process and the 'Public Benefit Test' p238. 
John Duns "Competition Law and Public Benefits" [ 1994) Ade laid Law Review I 6. 
Above n22 p253 citing [1976) 8 ALR 481 : A TPR para 40-012. 
16 
progress. If this conception is adopted, it is clear that it could be 
possible to argue in some cases that a benefit to the members or 
employees of the corporations involved served some acknowledged 
end of public policy even though no immediate or direct benefit to 
others was demonstrable". 
Similarly Duns cites the following passage from Rural Trades Co-
Operative (WA) Ltd
24 and Southern Cross Beverages
25 stating: 
24 
25 
"Before a benefit can properly be regarded as a benefit to the 
public for the purposes of section 102 (4) of the Act it must be seen 
as a benefit to the community generally. This does not mean that 
private benefit is necessarily irrelevant. The encouragement or 
enabling of an individual to pursue legitimate ends or to attain 
legitimate goals or to obtain legitimate rewards may well be 
beneficial to the community generally. When a benefit to a 
particular individual or segment of the community is pressed as a 
relevant benefit to the public .... the tribunal must assess whether 
the benefit to the individual or group can properly be so 
categorised". 
Above n22 p254 citing [ I 979] 37 FLR 244. 
Above n24 citing [ I 98 I] 50 FLR I 76. 
17 
In the ensumg discussion some of the decisions of the New Zealand 
Commerce Commission and the Courts will be analysed in detail in the 
application of the Public Benefit Test and further inquiries will be made 
into what it entails as the development of the test makes progress. 
18 
IV APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC BENEFIT TEST BY THE 
COMMISSION 
This section deals with the application of the Public Benefit provisions of 
the Act by the Commission in dealing with proposals for authorisation of 
Restrictive Trade Practices (R TPs) and Business Acquisitions in the past. 
Goodman Fielder Limited/Watties Industries Ltd
26 was an application 
for clearance for a proposal of a takeover by Goodman Fielder Ltd (GFL) 
of all the issued share capital of Wattie Industries Ltd (Wattie). The 
commission had to determine whether the takeover proposal would result 
in GFL acquiring or strengthening a dominant position in any market and 
if that were the case if any Public Benefit arising out of the 
implementation of the proposal would outweigh any detriment to the 
public resulting from such a dominant position. The Commission in 
assessing any Public Benefit stated: 
26 
27 
.... The effect is to allow detriments resulting from dominance to be 
offset by all public benefit resulting from the whole of the proposal 
and not merely those created by the dominance. The Commission 
could thus take into account not only any efficiency improved as a 
result of the dominance but also the Public Benefit inherent in the 
wider base provided by the merger .... 
27 
[1987] 1 NZBLC (Com) 104,109. 
Above n26, 104,147 para 259. 
19 
The commission went on to say that improved markets for New Zealand 
products overseas, improved prosperity and employment at home could be 
beneficial and confirmed that a stronger export base is a Public Benefit. 
Another aspect to which the Commission gave attention was the 
distribution of the benefit to the Consumer: 
.... Much would also depend upon the likelihood of the benefits 
being passed on to New Zealand consumers or the extent to which 
they would benefit in terms of the product range .... 
28 
It could then be summarised that while giving weight to improved export 
potential the Commission focused on the distributive effects of the claimed 
benefits to the consumers at large and was unconvinced that the merger 
proposal would realise this. The Commission concluded: 
.... It is competition which protects the consumer and the interests 
of the consumer must always 'bulk large" in the Commission's 
d l "b . 29 e z eratzons .... 
In Re Weddel Crown Corporation Ltd
30 an authorisation was sought for 
a Restrictive Trade Practice involving a collective agreement by a group of 
28 
29 
30 
Above n27, para 268. 
Above n27, para 278. 
[1987] I NZBLC (Com) 104,200. 
20 
meat companies seeking to shut down some meat works and jointly 
facilitating the costs of such closure. 
The Commission had to determine if such an arrangement would 
substantially lessen competition in a market and if any Public Benefit 
flowing from the arrangement would outweigh any substantial lessening of 
competition. 
The Commission attempted a definition of the term "Public" during the 
course of the determination in saying: 
.... As to the meaning of "Public" it seems clear from the preamble 
to the Act that 'public' refers to the New Zealand public. Further 
the term is wider than simply consumers. It could extend to various 
trade interests, such as manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers as 
well as to users, investors and so on. Further it includes benefits to 
the country as a whole as in the fostering of a national interest .... 
31 
It is submitted that this broader view of the term "public" was a fresh 
approach by the Commission which had previously stated in Goodman 
Fielder32
 that a Public Benefit should be distributed to the Consumer i.e 
the wider public and not just a section of the public. 
31 
32 
Above n30 I 04,213 para 25(iii). 
Above n26. 
21 
However the Commission did point out that a benefit to an individual 
would not itself constitute a benefit to the public
33 thus inferring that a 
private benefit would not be considered a benefit to the public. The 
determination by the Commission's majority was that the closure of the 
meatworks and the rationalisation needed to deal with the overcapacity in 
the market would have flowing back benefits to the farming industry and 
the New Zealand economy through a strengthened position in the 
international markets. 
It is submitted that a stronger position of a local industry in the world 
market through decreased costs was given due weight by the Commission 
in this decision. 
In Re Amcor Ltd/NZ Forest Products Ltd
34 an application for 
authorisation of a merger proposal was being considered, Amcor Ltd 
sought to acquire 50% of the shares of New Zealand Forest Products Ltd 
(NZFP). Some of the Commission ' s determinations with regard to 
assessing Public Benefit were: 
33 
34 
35 
1) The word "Public" refers to the New Zealand Public. This 
reiterated the decision in Weddel.
35 
Above n30 104,213 para 25(iv). 
[1987] I NZBLC (Com) 104,233 . 
Above n30. 
22 
2) The term "Public" was wider than simply consumers and 
could extend to various trade interests. This again was a 
similar pronouncement to the Weddel decision. 
3) A benefit to an individual would not constitute a Public 
Benefit as stated in "Weddel". 
4) The Applicants must show that the benefit will actually flow 
from the proposal i.e that it is likely to happen as a 
probability rather than a possibility. 
5) The benefit must flow to the New Zealand Public. 
6) Regional benefits were a Public Benefit. 
Some of the other benefits recognised in the decision include Job Security, 
Access to Foreign Markets, Increased Choice to Consumers, Increased 
Employment, Increased Economies of Scale, Utilisation of New Zealand 
Resources. 
A very broad spectrum of benefits were given consideration m this 
decision. 
23 
In Re The New Zealand Cooperative Dairy Company Ltd (NZCDC) 
/Auckland Cooperative Milk Producers Ltd
36 an application was made 
by NZCDC for clearance to acquire up to 60% of the shares of Auckland 
Cooperative Milk Producers Ltd. In assessing Public Benefit and 
comments on the weighing process of setting off any detriment against any 
benefit the Commission was of the view that the mere fact that dominance 
was evident is not in itself a detriment but that the commission should as 
far as practicable assess the degree of detriment: 
.... There appears also a burden on the Commission to assess as far 
as practicable the degree of competition detriment likely to flow 
from the accusation or strengthening of a dominant position .... it is 
only by attempting to assess the degree of detriment found or 
inferred from the acquisition or strengthening of dominance that 
the commission can come to understand the case the applicants 
have to answer if authorisation is to be granted. 
37 
In Weddel Crown38 too the Commission took the view that a proper 
weighting of detriment against benefit should take place outside the 
lessening of Competition as a per se detriment. 
36 
37 
38 
[ 1988] I NZBLC (Com) I 04,320. 
Above n36 104,337 para 8.5. 
Above n30. 
24 
The Commission went on to conclude m this decision that enhanced 
economic efficiency and enhanced consumer welfare through 
rationalisation would be recognised as Public Benefits and that the Act did 
not set a distributive standard, therefore it did not need to deny a public 
benefit claim simply because participants did not prove that it will flow to 
particular groups of the public. 
New Zealand Kiwi Fruit Exporters Association (Inc) / New Zealand 
Kiwi Fruit Cool Stores Association (Inc/
9 was a decision where the 
Commission applied the Public Benefit Test to a proposal by NZKEA 
seeking authorisation to enter into or give effect to certain price fixing 
arrangements under the provisions of the Commerce Act. In this instance, 
the Commission did not have to establish that there is a lessening of 
competition prior to proceeding to apply the Public Benefit Test. Section 
30 of the Act presumes that Price Fixing arrangements substantially lessen 
competition unless Public Benefit is seen to outweigh any detriment 
arising from the lessening of competition. In this decision the 
Commission mainly concerned itself with determining if any efficiency 
gains were prevalent: 
39 
40 
. . . . The Commission may assess pursuant to applying the Public 
Benefit Test, whether an agreement which lessens competition is 
more efficient than the competition which would or could not occur 
if h d "d . 40 z t e agreement z not exist .... 
[1989] 2 NZBLC (Com) 104,485. 
Above n39, I 04,500. 
25 
However the Commission went on to say that efficiency should not be the 
only consideration in the analysis of Public Benefit: 
This is not to say that efficiency is the only Public Benefit which can 
be taken into account . . . . in fact Public Benefit is a much wider 
concept encompassing other benefits as well.... Parliament could 
easily have confined the Commission's deliberations to competition 
or efficiency considerations had it so intended. 
41 
The Commission proceeded to mention the following as benefits, 
Innovation efficiencies, Allocative efficiencies and Productive efficiencies 
and discounted mere pecuniary or money savings. 
Re The New Zealand Grape Growers Council Incorporated
42 was 
again a decision where authorisation was being sought for a Price Fixing 
arrangement which was already in place. Section 59 of the Commerce Act 
prohibits the Commission from authorising existing practices, hence 
undertakings were received by the Commission that the practice would 
cease in order to enable the Commission to consider the application for 
authorisation of the practice. 
41 Above n39, I 04,50 I. 
42 [1991] 2 NZBLC (Com) 104,573 . 
26 
In analysing Public Benefit 
1) the Commission discounted cost savmgs as a significant 
benefit. 
2) Price stability was considered to be beneficial only if it 
provided an accurate reflection of market signals. The 
Commission considered that whatever the benefits from price 
stability it could still dull market signals hence leading to 
inappropriate decisions on quantity and quality of grapes etc 
and inefficient allocation of resources: 
.. .. While stability of price makes decision making 
easier, it does not necessarily lead to the right 
d . . b . d 43 eczszon ezng ma e. 
3) Equity of bargaining power was reflected as a benefit. 
4) Greater information exchange was not thought to be a 
significant benefit. 
5) Benefit to rural communities was considered of a mmor 
effect only. 
The Commission concluded in declining the application stating: 
43 Above n42, I 04,589 para 34.3 . 
27 
. . . . In any event, the viability of the industry and hence the 
communities, might ultimately be harmed to a greater extent if the 
practice leads to inefficiencies detrimental to the industry as a 
whole. 44 
It is submitted the Commission was quite focused on efficiency benefits in 
its determination in this decision. 
In New Zealand Cooperative Dairy Co Ltd / Waikato Valley 
Cooperative Dairies Ltd
45 an application was made for clearance of a 
proposed merger by New Zealand Cooperative Dairy to acquiring Waikato 
Valley either by asset purchase or by acquiring shares in the capital of that 
company. In this proposal the failing company argument was raised in 
support of the merger application which was rejected by the commission. 
Hence the commission went on to examine the Public Benefits claimed 
against any detriment. The benefits claimed were payout enhancement, 
avoidance of community disharmony, ability to compete internationally 
and avoidance of dairy farm failures. 
In considering payout enhancements as a benefit, although recognising 
that a section of the public i e. Shareholders of Waikato would benefit, the 
Commission rejected th·e benefit as it would not reach the wider public i.e 
the consumer. 
44 
45 
Above n42, 104,590 para 38.2. 
[1991] 2 NZBLC (Com) 104,592. 
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As regards ability to compete internationally the Commission rejected this 
as it was of the opinion that New Zealand Dairy or Waikato Valley would 
not directly compete in the international market as the Dairy Board would 
be the principal participant. Although cost savings would occur in the 
dairy industry it will not alter gross export returns. The comm1ss10n 
regarded Community harmony as a benefit but did not foresee the 
possibility of a serious disharmony occurring. 
This decision was appealed to the High Court. 
29 
V APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC BENEFIT TEST BY THE 
COURTS 
In New Zealand Cooperative Dairy Company Ltd (NZCDC) V 
Commerce Commission 
46 NZCDC was appealing to the High court from 
a decision of the Commission discussed above 
47 where an application for 
clearance of a merger proposal was declined by the Commission on 
grounds that the claimed Public Benefits did not outweigh any detriment 
arising from a lessening of competition that would occur if the merger was 
implemented. The high court appeal was brought after the amendment to 
the Commerce Act inserting section 3A.
48 The court noted that the 
Commission when dealing with the application, was doing so prior to the 
amendment to the Act. 
A further development in the course of events following the Commission 
decision was that the Minister of Commerce handed down to the 
commission a statement of government policy relating to the dairy 
industry under section 26
49 of the Act. Although this statement of policy 
did not directly refer to the declined merger proposal of NZCDC it was 
quite evident that the Commission's decision was reflected in the 
Minister's policy statement. 
46 
47 
48 
49 
[1991] 3 NZBLC 102,059. 
Above n45 . 
Above nlO. 
Above nl 1. 
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The court said: 
It would be naive to think that the issue of that statement was not a 
direct consequence of the Commission's decision in the present 
50 case. 
The court proceeded to weigh the benefits claimed against any perceived 
detriments and said that the statement of policy from the Minister inferring 
that structural rationalising would lead to greater efficiencies in the 
industry, did not absolve the court from the weighing exercise. As regards 
the failing company argument put forward by Waikato which was rejected 
by the Commission, the High Court on the basis of added evidence before 
it accepted that Waikato could not survive as an independent dairy 
company. However the court did not treat the failing company argument 
as a benefit per se, only giving the argument some credibility. 
The court viewed with favour the claimed Public Benefit of increased 
ability to compete internationally: 
50 
5 I 
We consider that the industry's ability to compete internationally 
will be enhanced by this merger. We regard this as a substantial 
public benefit · which is inextricably linked with industry 
rationalisation. 
51 
Above n46, I 02,066. 
Above n46, 102,088. 
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The court also said in overturning the commission's decision: 
.. .. These benefits .... will ultimately benefit New Zealand 
lb . . d. l 52 consumers, a ezt zn zrecty .... 
Thus the court discounted the identity of the beneficiaries or that a direct 
benefit to the consumer should occur as long as the benefits ultimately 
benefited New Zealanders. 
The Court at the outset of the appeal stated that it should put itself in the 
same position as the Commission if the Commission were hearing the case 
at the date of the appeal. Thus the contributing factor that had gone quite 
some way in influencing the outcome of the court decision was the 
amendment to the Commerce Act in section 3A, which required the 
commission to have regard to "any efficiencies" . The court decision 
clearly established that the proposed merger even if it did not benefit the 
wider public was being authorised by the Court due to the increased 
efficiencies it would produce in the process of rationalisation. 
This decision was a landmark decision in terms of the development of the 
Public Benefit Test. In the application of the test so far the Commission 
had taken note of a variety of benefits and appeared to in some instance 
focus on benefits to the consumer. 
The focus on the consumer was not always prevalent and had been 
unsystematic as evidenced in the earlier commission decisions discussed 
52 Above n51 . 
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above. It needs to be examined if the Court would apply a consistent focus 
which in the New Zealand Cooperative Dairy (Waikato) case appears to 
have been a shift to an efficiency focus. 
Following on from Waikato
53 the High Court had before it the case of 
Telecom Corporation of New Zealand V Commerce Commission
54 
where Telecom appealed from the Commission's determination declining 
clearance to Telecom for the purchase of the frequency AMPS-A from the 
Crown. In assessing the Public Benefits claimed by Telecom the Court 
adopted a "with" and "without" approach which required a prediction of 
the future with and without Telecom's acquisition of the frequency. The 
High Court however recognised the fact that section 3A compels attention 
to the likely efficiencies that will result form the acquisition but was of the 
view that those considerations should not exhaust society's interest in 
business conduct.
55 The High Court went on to state that any efficiencies 
gained must be passed on to the consumer and that the monopoly "should 
not fritter away its efficiency gains in slackness and rent seeking 
· · · ,, 56 actlv1t1es . 
The Court also addressed the issue of benefit to foreign shareholders as 
opposed to the New Zealand public which the commission had previously 
rejected as a benefit. The Court did not agree with this, stating: 
53 
54 
55 
56 
Above n46. 
[1991] 3 NZBLC (Com) 102,341(HC). 
Above n54, 102,383. 
Above n54, I 02,3 86. 
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New Zealand seeks to be a member of a liberal Multinational 
trading and investment community. Consistent with this stance, we 
observe the improvements in international efficiency create gains 
from trade and investment which from a long term perspective, 
benefits the New Zealand public. 
57 
Although not in agreement on this aspect of benefit to foreign investors the 
High Court endorsed the Commission's view that all other benefits 
claimed were efficiency gains only and that no competitive gains to the 
benefit of the public had flowed from the proposal to acquire rights to the 
AMPS-A frequency. The High Court confirmed the Commission's 
determination to decline clearance to the proposal. 
Thus the High Court had indicated contrary to its reasoning in Waikato,
58 
that efficiency benefits alone could not satisfy the weighing process in the 
Public Benefit Test. 
57 
58 
Above n56. 
Above n46. 
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VI WAS EFFICIENCY A FEATURE? 
It can be seen from the foregoing discussion that the Public Benefit Test in 
application has been unsystematic. The Commission and the Courts have 
in some instances focussed on consumer benefits or social or distributive 
elements, particularly so in the earlier decisions and also later in the 
Telecom decision and the High Court appeal. 
In other instances they have tended to focus on efficiencies that may or 
may not arise as a result of the authorisation and tended to discount 
distributive effects of the benefits flowing from such efficiencies. 
The Business Round Table, the influential proponent of Chicagoan 
thinking in New Zealand commented: 
"The Commission's treatment of the balancing exercise ... reflects 
the weaknesses in the Commission's analysis of 'detriments to the 
public' and 'Public Benefit' which follow from the efficiency effects 
of particular proposals. Given the manner in which the 
Commission had applied 'detriment to the public' and 'public 
benefit' its analysis is biased towards excessive intervention". 
59 
Professor Brock, a research fellow of the New Zealand Institute of 
Economic Research and a proponent of Chicagoan thinking said: 
59 Above n9. 
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"Many other issues that writers load on to Antitrust policy can be 
dealt with by specialised remedies". 
60 
Advocates of efficiency attempt to discredit considerations of income 
distribution. They claim that equal weight should be given to a dollar lost 
by consumers and a dollar gained by producers even through producers 
may be considerably richer than consumers on average.
61 
Douglas Greer made this statement in a published study on the two 
objectives of efficiency and competition in 1989. Advocacy of 
Competition on the other hand Greer says, does not necessarily mean the 
achievement of perfect competition. He is of the view that the preamble of 
the Commerce Act 1986 uses the words "An Act to promote competition 
in Markets within New Zealand. He says the qualifying word "promoting" 
suggests a degree of competition in structure and conduct that is more 
rivalrous than would occur under complete laissez - fare, but a degree that 
would correspond more closely with notions of "workable competition" 
than with notions of "perfect competition". The Commerce Act 1986 in 
fact defines competition as workable competition: 
60 
6 1 
62 
Section 3(1) [Competition] In this Act "Competition means 
k bi ,ll', 
. . . 62 
wor a e or eJJectzve compefltzon. 
W.A Brock "Antitrust Debate in New Zealand - A Commentary" New Zealand 
Business Round Table 1989. 
Douglas F Greer "Efficiency and Competition - Alternative Complimentary or 
Conflicting Objectives" New Zealand Institute of Economic Research Monograph 47, 
1989. 
Commerce Act 1986 section 3 (!). 
36 
Thus Greer's study recommends a middle road between the New Zealand 
Harvardians and Chicagoans, recommending a workable competition 
model. Greer relies on economists such as J M Clark, Edward Mason, 
Corwin Edwards
63 as proponents of workable competition. 
Comments such as these led to the Government introducing amendments 
to the Commerce Act 1986 including a new section 3A: 
3A Where the Commission is required under this Act to determine 
whether or not, or the extent to which, conduct will result, or will 
be likely to result, in benefit to the public, the Commission shall 
have regard to any efficiencies that the Commission considers will 
result or will be likely to result, from that conduct. 
Another amendment to the Act in 1990 was section 26: 
26(1) [Economic polices] in the exercise of its powers under this 
Act the Commission shall have regard to the economic policies of 
the Government as transmitted in writing from time to time to the 
Commission by the Minister. 
Pickford in a recent article says the conflict between the alternative 
standards i.e Harvard v Chicago has been a feature of the chequered 
history of competition policy cases since 1987. He says: 
63 Above n61, 117. 
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The Commission had adopted an unusual economic welfare 
function with which to evaluate public benefits and detriments, one 
which seemed inconsistent with standards of conventional cost 
benefit analysis. 
64 
Having said this in reference to the application of the Public Benefit Test 
in the earlier decisions Pickford goes on to comment on the decisions after 
the 1990 amendment saying: 
Since 1990 there has been a shift in the application of the 
authorisation test, whereby efficiency gains have been weighted 
h ·1 65 more eavzy. 
Pickford in a recent article says the reason for this shift is the section 3A 
amendment, requiring the Commission to have regard to "any 
efficiencies". He also cites Ahdar as saying that "efficiency gains, even if 
redounding solely to the firms concerned, should be given due weight 
despite not being passed on to the consumer".
66 On the other hand, he 
cites van Ro/
7 as saying that efficiency had been incorporated by the 
comm1ss10n m its evaluation of Public Benefit before the 1990 
64 
65 
66 
67 
Michael Pickford "The Evaluation of Public Benefit and Detriment under the 
Commerce Act I 986 - New Zealand Economic Papers I 993 vol 27 pp209-23 I . 
Above n64, 221. 
Above n65 citing Rex Ahdar. 
Above n65 citing Yvonne van Roy "Guide book to New Zealand Competition Laws" 
1991 pp247-248. 
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amendment. Pickford cites van Roy in saying that the Telecom decision 
appeared to state that the new section made little practical difference. 
68 
It is submitted that this paper agrees with the latter view that the 
Commission had adopted efficiency measurements at certain times prior to 
199069 and that the Telecom decision in the High Court hardly seemed to 
be influenced by section 3A. Thus the application of the Public Benefit 
Test in practice was still quite unsystematic. Despite the 1990 amendment 
to the Act the Commission and the Courts had not applied the test with any 
certainty. 
68 
69 
Above n54. 
For example in New Zealand Cooperative Dairy Company/Auckland Cooperative Milk 
Producers [ 1988] I NZBLC 104,327. 
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VII REVIEW OF THE COMMERCE ACT 1986 
Following on from the critical views of the New Zealand Chicagoans as 
discussed above,
70 the Government commissioned a review group to review 
the Commerce Act in 1991. One of the terms of reference constituting the 
review group 
71 this paper is concerned with, is the review of the economic 
cost/benefit analysis undertaken and the scope of the "Public Benefit" test 
applied by the Commerce Commission.
72 
The review group initially published a discussion document.
73 The 
document sets out the key issues to be dealt with in the review as: 
(a) whether the Act uses the best approach to achieve its 
objectives and 
(b) Whether the range of economic activities the Act applies to 
should be changed. 
The objective of the Act is identified as protecting the competitive process 
from private arrangements and not as a design for generating more 
competition. An analysis of the two sides of the threshold test is stated as 
70 
71 
72 
73 
Above n54. 
Participants include Ministry of Commerce, The Treasury, Department of Justice and the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 
Other terms include (a) the extent of the Act's application (b) the treatment of mergers 
and takeovers ( c) arrangements for efficient enforcement of the Act. 
Review of the Commerce Act 1986 - A Discussion Document, 1991. 
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{a) Those who consider the Act should focus solely on efficiency 
argue that the test in the Act should be framed in a way that 
channels the analysis towards narrowly weighing up any 
reduction in allocative efficiency against possible gains from 
greater productive efficiencies ... 
(b) Those who see a wider role for the Act argue that a reduction 
in allocative efficiency does not include all the detriments 
from a reduction in competition, while productive efficiencies 
do not capture all the benefits. 
The review group concluded that a competition threshold would provide a 
flexible and practical proxy around which a statute can be designed to test 
claims about economic efficiency. The paper recommends: 
"The use of the Competitive threshold is sensible regardless of 
whether the Act focuses on economic efficiency or also takes into 
account social and distributive concerns". 
74 
The discussion document also recommended that the preservation of the 
competition threshold would be in line with the OECD experience and the 
focus of antitrust law ih the United States. It is submitted that this view 
facilitates co-operation between New Zealand and other nations in 
formulating economic policy. 
74 Above n73, 6. 
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Having clarified its position on the policy behind the Act the discussion 
document examines the Public Benefit Test and classifies the issues 
pertaining to the test as: 
1 What constitutes a benefit. 
2 The Evaluation of the benefit. 
3 The meaning of the word 'Public'. 
The document examined the decisions of the Commission and the Courts in 
the past and concluded that the Commission had taken too broad a view of 
claims that could be considered as being benefits and that less weighting 
had been given to economic factors. The discussion document also noted 
that the Courts had not ruled out the incorporation of distributive values of 
New Zealand society. 
It suggested two options for the Public Benefit Test. 
(a) Retain the test as it was or retain the test and add a list of 
matters that are to be treated as benefits in a schedule to the 
Act or 
(b) Limit the analysis of the Test to net national economic 
benefits by amendment to the Act. 
Thus it was clear that the Government review group favoured the approach 
of preserving the competition threshold in the Act, but had outlined the 
42 
options available to clarify the Act in terms of the Public Benefit Test in 
broad terms. 
However when the final review document was released in 1993 
75 following 
submissions from various interested parties and the industry etc the 
Government review group had changed direction somewhat in stating: 
There is consensus in the review team and among those consulted, 
that the efficiency gains and losses associated with a merger or 
practice are the principal consideration in the application of the 
Public Benefit Test. 
The review group cites the Telecom High Court case as its authority for this 
view to a limited extent. In Telecom it was stated: 
The more efficient use of society's resources in itself is a benefit to 
the public to which some weight should invariably be given. That is 
not to say it is the only consideration or indeed . .. the most 
. "d . 76 important consz eratzon. 
The comment offered by the review group m response to the above 
statement from Telecom: 
75 
76 
Review of the Commerce Act 1986 by Ministry of Commerce, The Treasury, The 
Department of Justice and The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 1993. 
Above n75, para 2.11. 
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This statement is consistent with section 3A of the Act, which 
requires the commission to "have regard to any efficiencies". 
However given the policy objectives of the Act the majority of the 
review team considers that the analysis of efficiency related benefits 
and detriments arising from a proposed merger or practice should 
be the principal consideration in every decision. ... 
77 
It is submitted that the review group, while relying on the Telecom High 
Court decision, had made a recommendation well beyond what the court 
had said in Telecom. Telecom was categorically clear in stating that 
society's interest in business conduct was of value. The Courts said: 
"Efficiency consideration positive and negative are relevant in the 
assessment of both benefit and detriment but clearly do not exhaust 
society's interest in the business conduct - the subject of the 
C A 
,, 78 
ommerce et . 
The High Court's view in the Telecom case was consistent with section 3A 
of the Act which says "regard should be had to any efficiencies". The 
review team, however was of the opinion that the decision in Telecom 
(HC) and section 3A would not provide any certainty to the Public Benefit 
Test. It said: 
77 
78 
.... in order to remove doubt and to avoid possible future deviation 
by the Courts or the Commission, the Act should be amended to 
Above n75 , para 2.12. 
Above n54, I 02,383 . 
./ 
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ensure that the principal role of efficiency analysis in the 
authorisation process is explicit. 
79 
Thus the group recommended a total shift which was not supported by the 
facts in Telecom, neither in the words of the Act. 
The proposals of the review group were: 
(a) The principal role of efficiency analysis must be made explicit 
in the Act. 
(b) That no account should be taken of the identity of those who 
gain benefit as long as the benefit accrues to New Zealand. 
( c) Resources to consumers and producers should be of equal 
value. 
It is submitted that any amendment of the Act to explicitly state the 
principal role of the efficiency analysis could well make efficiency the 
principal focus of the Act thereby defeating the object of the Act which is to 
protect competition within New Zealand. In fact the preamble to the Act 
would well denigrate in· status. Also there is no support in the common law 
for this shift of focus. 
79 Above n75 para 2.14. 
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VIII CABINET DECISIONS 
The government review group's recommendations were reported to cabinet, 
following which cabinet recorded the following decisions in relation to 
assessing benefits and detriments in the application of the Public Benefit 
Test. The following decisions were announced in a cabinet paper.
80 
80 
Cabinet has: 
a 
b 
agreed that the Commerce Act be amended to clarify the basis 
on which the Commerce Commission and the Courts assess 
the benefits and detriments arising from anticompetitive 
mergers and practices; 
agreed that the amendments be effected by: 
1 replacing the words "benefit to the public" with 
"benefit to New Zealand " in the sections of the Act 
relating to the authorisation of anticompetitive mergers 
and practices or other words which capture the intent 
of 
A making clear in the statute that even where little 
or none of the benefit accrues to other than the 
owners of a business it will be treated as a 
benefit,· and 
Cabinet Paper 1993. 
46 
B ensuring that the Commission and the Courts 
can take into account whether or not benefits 
which accrue outside of New Zealand create 
gains from trade and investment which will 
benefit New Zealand or are monopoly rents 
which arise neither from cost savings nor 
innovation; 
2 amending section 3A of the Act to reflect that in 
assessing applications for the authorisation of 
anticompetitive mergers and practices: 
A the consideration of productive, allocative and 
dynamic efficiency will be the principal element 
of the analysis; 
B no account shall be taken of the identity of those 
who gain the "benefit to New Zealand"; and 
3 the preparation of a draft section 26 statement of the 
Government's economic policy in relation to transfers 
of ·wealth between consumers and producers to the 
effect that the Governments policy is to value resources 
equally regardless of whether it is in the hands of 
consumers or producers; 
ii noted that the Commerce Commission intends to 
publish guidelines on the way it applies the public 
benefit test; and 
47 
iii noted that officials will continue to monitor the effect 
of the above amendments including the effects of the 
guidelines; 
It appeared Cabinet was clearly setting out to implement the 
recommendations made by the review group in identifying productive, 
allocative and dynamic efficiencies as the principal elements of the Public 
Benefit v Detriment analysis. However to date no further progress has been 
reported with regard to implementing the Cabinet decisions. 
Thus there was still much uncertainty about the application of the Public 
Benefit Test with the Act in its current form. 
In October 1994 the Commerce Commission issued a set of guidelines for 
dealing with the Public Benefit Test. This set of guidelines was intended to 
clarify the Commission' s approach to assessing Public Benefit and 
detriment as noted in the Cabinet decisions referred to above.
81 
8 I Above p37. 
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IX THE COMMERCE COMMISSION GUIDELINES TO THE 
ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC BENEFITS AND DETRIMENTS 1994 
In the introduction to the set of guidelines for the analysis of Public Benefit 
and Detriment the Commission recognises the need for consistency in the 
application of the Public Benefit Test. 
The general acceptance of the guidelines coupled with proposed 
changes to the Act would enable a consistent approach to Public 
Benefit evaluation .... 
82 
The Commission however notes that the guidelines will not be taking 
precedence over the intent and spirit of the Act, in other words it infers that 
the guidelines will not be applied at all cost despite the provision of the Act. 
82 
83 
The guidelines are not a mechanistic procedure for making 
determinations. The words of the statute will be paramount and each 
case will be examined in their own light. The guidelines are to 
enable consistency for present and future commissions and the 
b 
. . 83 uszness communzty. 
Commerce Commission "Guidelines to the Analysis of Public Benefit and Detrim
ent in 
the Context of the Commerce Act October 1994, p I. 
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A A Summary Of The Guidelines 
(a) Efficiency gains to include tangible as well as intangible 
benefits. 
(b) Tangibles to include: 
(i) Economies of scale. 
(ii) Economies of scope. 
(iii) Improved utilisation of capacity. 
(iv) Cost reductions. 
(v) Reduced transaction costs. 
( c) Intangibles to include: 
(i) Environmental improvements. 
(ii) Improvements to health 
(d) Net gains as opposed to transfer of wealth between groups; 
both economic and social aspects will be relevant. 
( e) Efficiency gains should be net gains, not mere changes in 
inputs and outputs. 
(f) Double counting prohibited. 
(g) Consideration should be with and without the proposal and 
the claimed benefits. 
50 
(i) Distribution of benefit is irrelevant. 
G) The public should be the New Zealand public only; benefit to 
foreigners can only be to the extent that it benefits the New 
Zealand public. 
(k) Increased employment should be at a national level. 
(l) Domestic earnings to take precedence over export earnings. 
B Comparison Of The Guidelines And The Commission's Past 
Application Of The Public Benefit Test 
There are clearly major differences between the guidelines noted above 
and the approach of the Commission and the Courts, dealt with earlier in 
the paper. Some examples would be: 
Goodman Fielder/Wattie
84 which gave weight to export potential and the 
distributional effects of the benefits. The guidelines do not give weight to 
export earnings as against domestic earnings and the distribution of 
benefits is considered per se irrelevant. 
Weddel Crown
85 attempted a definition of the word 'Public ' and 
concluded that the benefit should arise to the New Zealand public. The 
Commission also stated that the benefit could extend to various interest 
84 
85 
Above n26. 
Above n30. 
51 
groups such as manufacturers, wholesalers retailers etc. This coincides 
with the guidelines which defines 'Public' as the New Zealand public and 
also states that the distribution of the benefit is irrelevant per se. However 
in this decision the Commission determined that a benefit to an individual 
would not constitute a benefit to the public. This is now contradicted by 
the guidelines which states "if one New Zealander is better off over time 
and all other New Zealanders are no worse off, a public benefit has been 
achieved". 
86 
Amcor87 recognised regional benefits, job security, consumer choice, and 
increased employment among other benefits. The guidelines now 
specifically reject regional benefit. It states a benefit should be to all of 
New Zealand. The guidelines also provide that job security and increased 
employment will not be benefits unless national employment increases. 
Also consumer choice in itself is now not a benefit as the guidelines 
specifically reject a distributional objective from any claimed benefits. 
New Zealand Co-operative Dairy/Auckland Milk Producers
88 
recognised enhanced economic efficiency and enhanced consumer welfare 
through rationalisation as Public Benefits. This is in line with the 
Commission's guidelines. 
86 Above n82,9. 
87 Above n34. 
88 Above n36 
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Kiwi Fruit Exporters/Kiwi Fruit Coolstorers
89 recognised innovative, 
allocative and productive efficiencies, despite going on to state that 
efficiency will not be the only consideration. The guidelines appear to 
focus heavily on efficiencies as the principal benefit in line with the 
proposals of the Government review team which also support this view. 
New Zealand Co-Operative Dairy/Waikato Valley
90 recognised 
community harmony but rejected the ability to compete internationally as 
not being a benefit. On appeal however the High Court was of the opinion 
that the ability to complete internationally would be a benefit and 
discounted the identity of the consumer. The High Court ' s reasoning is 
reflected in the Commission's guidelines, which is a shift from the 
Commission's earlier determination. 
Telecom (HC)9
1 all would not be in conformity with the Commission's 
guidelines with regard to recognising benefits such as overseas shareholder 
profits. The guidelines state that overseas shareholder gains would only be 
considered if benefits accrue to New Zealanders. The distribution to 
consumers aspect, that Telecom (HC) stressed as a benefit that must be 
considered in any analysis, has also been rejected by the Commission 's 
guidelines as irrelevant. 
From the foregoing examples it is evident that the Commission 's approach 
to the Public Benefit Test has changed radically from a social distributive 
89 
90 
9 1 
Above n39. 
Above n45 . 
Above n54. 
53 
perspective, with a few exceptions such as the Weddel Crown decision, to 
an entirely efficiency based approach. 
C What Is Efficiency? 
The Government's review of the Commerce Act and the Commerce 
Commission's guidelines give much recognition to the consideration of 
efficiencies in the application of the Public Benefit Test. There appears to 
be a presumption that "efficiency" is per se economic efficiency. Yet 
Douglas Greer, a non efficiency advocate disagrees with this view. 
He offers this pronouncement by Pitofsky: 
92 
"It is bad history, bad policy and bad law to exclude certain 
political values in interpreting the antitrust laws. By "political 
values" I mean, first a fear that excessive concentration of 
economic power will breed anti democratic political pressures, and 
second, a desire to enhance individual and business freedom by 
reducing the range within which private discretion by a few in the 
economic sphere controls the welfare of all. A third and overriding 
political concern is that if the free-market sector of the economy is 
allowed to develop under antitrust rules that are blind to all but 
economic concerns, the likely result will be an economy so 
dominated by a few corporate giants that it will be impossible for 
the state not to play a more intrusive role in economic affairs. 
92 
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Greer quotes Pitofsky in warning that Government intrusion would entail 
government ownership and intensive price regulation. This paper submits 
that Pitofsky's statement which talks of the prevalent United States arena 
would be even more relevant here in New Zealand despite the absence of 
such populist values, as commercial giants are so few in number in this 
country that economic power would be concentrated in the hands of those 
few and government intervention would be inevitable. 
Efficiency has traditionally been defined as: 
1 Allocative efficiency 
2 Productive efficiency 
3 Dynamic efficiency 
Allocative efficiency - this refers to the optimum method of allocating 
available resources. 
Productive efficiency - is in reference to production costs in terms of total 
outputs i.e producing the most at the least cost. 
Dynamic efficiency this refers to progress in technology and innovation 
thus bringing about a reduction in overall costs in the long term. 
Greer questions which of the above efficiencies fit in to the New Zealand 
Public Benefit Test. He says efficiency gains are easier to allege than to 
prove and measurement of efficiency gains is difficult. He notes: 
55 
Achievements in one area of efficiency may have no positive impact 
elsewhere. Given limited resources for antitrust enforcement, 
priorities would then be needed to achieve the greatest net benefit 
from the enforcement costs. Achievements in one area of efficiency 
d tl · ,m · · l h ,, 93 may pro uce cos y meJJzczenczes e sew ere . 
The guidelines list the following as efficiency gains: 
• economies of scale 
• economies of scope 
• better utilisation of existing capacity 
• reduced labour costs 
• lower working capital 
• reduced transaction costs 
In Telecom (HC) what the applicants claimed as efficiencies were largely 
discounted by the Courts due to the hypothetical nature of the
 
quantification. 
The Commission says in the recent guidelines that benefits in terms of
 
efficiency improvements provides a discipline upon the items included and 
the weight given to them. The guidelines recommend that efficiency
 
improvements must be measured with respect to change in all outputs and 
all inputs, and not just the change in selected outputs or inputs such as 
import/export savings, energy savings, expenditure savings etc which are 
considered partial measures and would not in themselves qualify as 
93 Above n6 l , 23. 
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efficiency improvements. The Commission considers increased net profits 
due to cost savings while outputs remain unchanged to be an efficiency 
gain which should be given due consideration. Thus the Commission's 
guidelines appear to be driven by profit margin measures of efficiency. 
The Commerce Act in section 3A states that regard should be had to "any 
efficiencies". The Commission's guidelines appear to narrow this down 
paying close attention to the bottom line as it were, rather than efficiency 
gains in selected areas. The words "regard should be had to any 
efficiencies" is a broad definition implying any gain should be considered 
in the benefit v detriment analysis. 
It is submitted that this interpretation by the Commission modifies the Act. 
D Distributional Issues 
In the earlier Commission decisions discussed above it was evident that 
the Commission was fairly persistent in focusing on the distributional 
effects of the benefits claimed. Telecom (HC) pronounced clear 
principles on this topic. 
It stated in Telecom citihg re Rural Traders Co-Operative (WA) Ltd.
94 
94 
Before a benefit (or detriment) can properly be regarded as a 
benefit (or detriment) to the public for the purposes of the 
[1979] ATPR 10-110 pl23. 
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assessment of public benefit required by section 90(9) it must be 
seen as a benefit (or detriment) to the community generally .... 
.... It is relevant that the Australian Tribunal has always proceeded 
on the basis that the term "benefit to the Public" draws attention to 
the possibility that business conduct, that would otherwise infringe 
the Act may have social value. Hence it would not be in the public 
interest to rely exclusively upon the functioning of competitive 
markets to deliver everything "of value to the community 
generally" .... 
. . . . We have concluded that this approach is applicable to 
authorisation under the New Zealand Act. This does not rule out 
the incorporation of distributive values of New Zealand society in 
the assessment of Public Benefit. 
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Thus the common law as it has evolved in Telecom which is the most 
recent pronouncement on this topic appears to emphasise that the 
distributional aspect of a claimed benefit is also of importance and should 
not be ignored. 
However the Commis-sion's guidelines takes a radical approach by 
providing that the relevance of distributional aspects per se should not play 
a part in the analysis of Public Benefit. 
95 Above n54, I 02,383 . 
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The Commission's guidelines form the view that the Act may
 have 
indirect distributional objectives through the promotion of competitio
n, but 
does not contemplate direct distributional benefits. While this 
paper 
accepts such a view to a limited extent it is submitted that the defini
tion of 
"market" plays a crucial role in arriving at a conclusion on the
 Act's 
objectives. "Public Benefit" is not defined in the Act, hence it m
ust be 
construed in the context of the Act's entirety. 
The market definition is provided in section 3(l)(A): 
3(l)(A) [Market]. Every reference in this Act, except the reference 
in section 36A(l)(b) and (c) of this Act, to the term "Market " 
is a reference to a market in New Zealand for goods or 
services as well as other goods and services that , as a 
matter of fact and commercial common sense, are 
substitutable for them. 
Seeing that the Public Benefit Test is only applied when authori
sing a 
restrictive trade practice or a merger or acquisition that substa
ntially 
lessens competition or strengthens a dominant position in a "marke
t" it is 
contended that Public benefit should surely flow through to tha
t very 
market by the very authorisation of such a practice or merger, onc
e it is 
concluded that the benefit outweighs any detriment. As the m
arket 
definition in the Act is in terms of the supply or acquisition of go
ods or 
services it must apply to the consumption of such goods or servic
es and 
therefore the "consumer". Thus it is contended that the distribution
 of the 
benefit to the consumer is intended to a large extent in the Act and t
hat the 
definition of the word "market" goes quite some way in establishin
g that. 
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The Public Benefit Test should prove that a benefit is realisable to the 
market hence to the consumer of the goods or services the subject of the 
authorisation or clearance of a practice or merger. Although this 
interpretation would not mean that the benefit should extend to the public 
at large as long as it is contended that benefit to the "consumer" in a small 
market or large, despite the significance in size in proportion to the 
population of New Zealand was intended in the Act. 
Thus the Commission's view expressed in the guidelines that no attempt 
will be made to define who is "public" or "private" in assessing public 
benefit, and if a benefit has been gained by one and all other New 
Zealanders are no worse off a public benefit has been achieved, is a 
modification of the Act. It is submitted that the Act establishes through its 
definition of the word "market" that a benefit must flow through to the 
market in which the goods or services, the subject of the authorisation, are 
supplied or acquired. Thus this paper puts forward the view that 
distribution to the consumer must surely be intended in the Act. 
E Domestic V Foreign Slzareltolders 
The Commission provides in the guidelines that the word public is to be 
inferred as the New Zealand public, hence benefits to foreigners are to be 
counted only to the extent that they also involve benefits to New 
Zealanders. The guideline states "inflows of overseas capital of 
themselves are not benefits to New Zealand since they are made in return 
for the subsequent outflow of dividends, interest and capital repayments". 
However the guidelines recognise inflows of technology transfer of access 
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to overseas markets as public benefits that are linked to foreign investment 
in New Zealand. 
Telecom (HC) proffered some principles on the issue of overseas 
investment in New Zealand stating that international efficiencies create 
gains from trade and investment which, from a long run perspective 
benefit the New Zealand public. However this was qualified by the Court 
in saying that recognising such a benefit does not mean a monopolist 
exercise its market power to gain subnormal profits, which accrue to 
overseas shareholders as this would be an exploitation of the New Zealand 
public. In its prior determination the Commission in Telecom did not 
totally disregard benefits to foreign owners but only gave it minimal 
weight. The High Court in Telecom said: 
We reject any view that profits earned by overseas investment in 
this country are necessarily to be regarded as a drain on New 
Zealand. New Zealand seeks to be a member of a liberal 
multilateral trading and investment community. Consistent with 
this stance, we observe that improvements in international 
efficiency create gains from trade and investment which, from a 
long-run perspective, benefit the New Zealand public. 
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Thus it is submitted that the Commission's guidelines take a narrow view 
of overseas investments/shareholders benefits as only being a benefit if it 
benefits New Zealanders, on the basis that the Act refers to in its preamble, 
96 Above n54, I 02,386. 
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the promotion of competition in markets within New Zealand
. The 
Government Review Group said: 
The review team notes however, that many medium and large sized
 
firms 'that are generally thought of as being New Zealand firms
 
{Air New Zealand, Brierley Investments and Fletcher Challenge) 
have significant overseas shareholdings. Accordingly that 
domestic/foreign distinction is often not easily made and is 
therefore, not usually a useful basis for analysis under the 
Commerce Act. Nevertheless, the review team agreed with the 
general thrust of the High Court's approach that competition law 
should not discourage foreign investment that is likely to provide 
benefits to New Zealand economy but should discourage the 
transfer overseas of functionless monopoly rents. 
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It is contended that the Government review group and Telecom's vie
w is a 
more appropriate and accurate interpretation of the preamble of th
e Act 
than that espoused by the Commission's guidelines. "Markets withi
n New 
Zealand" does not directly mean "benefits to New Zealanders" 
as the 
guidelines indicate. Foreign investment could promote competition 
within 
New Zealand which should be a benefit in itself rather than if 
it only 
extends to benefits to New Zealanders. 
97 Above n75, 12 para 2.46. 
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If the merger or restrictive trade practice that is the su
bject of the 
authorisation could be proved to be a benefit to the New Zeala
nd market, it 
should satisfy the Act's requirement of promoting competition
 within New 
Zealand. In fact it is suggested that the Commission's 
guideline in 
insisting on benefits to New Zealanders as opposed to bene
fits to New 
Zealand is bringing in a distributional objective which is con
tradictory to 
its view on the topic of distribution of benefits. Thus there 
appear to be 
inconsistencies within the guidelines. 
F Creation And Retention Of Employment 
The Commission's guidelines provide that creation or reten
tion of jobs 
would not in themselves be an efficiency gain, hence they fal
l outside the 
definition of Public Benefits. The guideline also provides
 that unless 
national employment levels increase no additional weighting w
ill be given 
to increased employment. It is submitted that establishing 
increases in 
national employment would be an uphill task in a prospectiv
e merger or 
restrictive trade practice proposal. Surely increases 
in localised 
employment should have some effect on national employm
ent figures. 
While on the one hand the guidelines are at pains to explain t
hat a benefit 
to one is a benefit to all, it appears to take on a distributive ro
le in stating 
that national employment as opposed to increased region
al or local 
employment would only qualify as a benefit. 
The object of the Act in promoting competition within New 
Zealand and 
the definition of the word "market" in the Act does not
 impose an 
extended geographic dimension to the Public Benefit Test tha
t all of New 
Zealand should benefit from the authorisation or clearance pro
cess, as long 
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as the benefit is "within" New Zealand . It is submitted that in discounting 
increased employment or retention of employment as a benefit in itself the 
Commission is promoting an efficient but shrinking industry concept 
which again is not supported by the provisions of the Act. 
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X RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AUSTRALIA 
Around the same time as the New Zealand Government Review Gro
up had 
produced a discussion document and undertook the Review 
of the 
Commerce Act, the federal governments of Australia 
jointly 
commissioned the Hilmer committee
98 to review the competition policy 
and its basic principles in all of Australia. 
Australia had a similar authorisation procedure under the Trade Pr
actices 
Act as New Zealand's Commerce Act and the Australian Trade Pr
actices 
Commission was responsible for authorising otherwise anti comp
etitive 
arrangements and mergers on a case by case basis just as in New Ze
aland. 
There was however one major difference between Australia and
 New 
Zealand, in that price fixing arrangements were not deemed per se 
illegal 
as it was under the Act in New Zealand. Thus price fixing arrange
ments 
in Australia had to first satisfy the lessening of competition test an
d only 
following such a finding that the Public Benefit Test provisions 
of the 
Trade Practices Act would be applied. The Hilmer co
mmittee 
recommended in its findings that Australia should follow the New Z
ealand 
legislation in deeming price fixing arrangements to be per se illeg
al and 
have the continued availability of the authorisation process for such 
illegal 
practices to continue. The Committee recognised two main rationa
les for 
the universal and uniform application of competitive conduct ru
les i.e 
efficiency and equity. The report said: 
98 F G Hilmer, Independent Committee of Inquiry into a Nationa
l Competition Policy 
(Canberra 1993) - The Hilmer Report. 
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The efficiency rationale has never been more important. Australia 
is under increasing pressure to improve its international 
competitiveness so as to maintain and improve living standards. Jn 
this environment pleas for special treatment warrant the closest 
scrutiny. This is particularly so in respect of many of the current 
exemptions from the TP A including some government provided 
services such as electricity and port services and private 
professional services which are largely sheltered from international 
competition yet provide key inputs to businesses that must contend 
with domestic and international competition. 
99 
It should be noted that the Committee stressed the importance of
 living 
standards in Australia in applying the efficiency rationale quoted 
above. 
Thus there was an indication that consumer benefit was an im
portant 
consideration of the Australian governments in commissioning the 
review 
of competition policy. The governments were unanimous that all 
market 
participants had to be treated equally with universal rules whether 
they be 
government corporations or private firms and that no exemptions 
should 
apply. 
The committee stressed that Public Benefit was not defined in the A
ct but 
made reference to the· case of re ACI Operations Pty Ltd 
100 which 
recognised economic development, fostering business efficiency, su
pply of 
better information to consumers, growth in export markets, expan
sion of 
employment and environmental protection as Public Benefits. 
99 
100 
Above n98 Cap 5, 86. 
[1991] ATPR (Com) 50,108. 
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Unlike the Government review in New Zealand, it noted that eco
nomic 
efficiency was considered paramount but additional benefits must be
 given 
consideration in assessing if benefit outweighed detriment. 
The Committee in its final consideration of the application of the 
Public 
Benefit Test said that although the committee had sympathy wi
th the 
submissions received which urged that Public Benefit consider
ations 
should be limited to matters of economic efficiency it did not fe
el that 
parties should be denied the opportunity to demonstrate "other dime
nsions 
of community welfare". This approach is quite different to the
 New 
Zealand government review group's recommendation, 
which 
recommended a prime facie "efficiency" approach to the analysis of
 Public 
Benefit. 
Thus it is submitted that the Hilmer Committee was recommending 
a "Yes 
competition but efficiency" approach which is the workable comp
etition 
model discussed earlier.
101 This paper supports this view. 
IOI Above pp35 and 36. 
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XI CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing discussion it is submitted that the recent 
Government 
review and the Commission's guidelines are not consiste
nt with the 
provisions of the Act. The paper has analysed the compe
tition versus 
efficiency arguments and concludes that a compromised app
roach would 
be ideal, i.e a workable competition model. 
The common law as it had evolved in the Telecom (HC) decis
ion does not 
support the view that efficiency considerations should b
e the only 
consideration in the analysis of Public Benefit and Detriment.
 This paper 
has argued that the government review group had over 
extended its 
interpretation of the Telecom (HC) decision in stating tha
t efficiency 
analysis should assume a principal role in the authorisation pr
ocess. As it 
turned out in the Telecom (HC) decision the court was of t
he view that 
section 3A of the Act did not make much difference to the im
plementation 
of the Public Benefit Test. 
It is also apparent from the above analysis of the Commiss
ion's recent 
guidelines that an extended geographic dimension has crept in
to the Public 
Benefit Test despite also conveying that the distribution o
f benefit is 
irrelevant per se. Thus this paper submits that conflicting sign
als are being 
given in the guidelines and concludes that the authorisation pr
ocess within 
the Act clearly contemplates benefits flowing through to the
 market and 
therefore the consumer. Hence an efficiency only analy
sis will be 
contradictory to the provisions of the Act. 
68 
A total efficiency approach could leave the New Zealand competition 
policy isolated from the rest of the world and efficiencies that do not 
reflect or accrue benefits to consumers resulting in firms ' slackness at 
maximum profit levels. The Australian approach is sensible, that society's 
standard of living should improve as a result of an effective competition 
policy. This has not been given consideration in New Zealand. Thus this 
paper recommends the Government of New Zealand re-think its stance in 
the development of competition policy and achieve a compromise based 
on the workable competition model. Consumer living standards would be 
the best corroborative evidence of a well thought out competition process. 
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